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Articles
Richard Haigh* Franchising in the Shadow of
Contract Law: A New Fidelity for
Business Relations'
The institution of franchising has experienced a remarkable growth in North
America in recent years. This has provoked a variety of legislative and judicial
responses. This article examines the reasons behind the rise of franchising. It
proceeds to examine the principal models of statutory regulation of franchise
arrangements, and also the range of common law doctrines which courts have
brought to bear on disputes arising out of such contracts. The author points out
deficiencies in the existing models of franchise regulation and, drawing on legal
responses to family disputes, proposes an alternative.
L 'institution du franchisage a connu une croissance remarquable en Amorique du
Nord au cours des derniores annoes, ce qui a amend une varioto de d6velop-
pements I6gislatifs et judiciaires. Le prdsent article 6tudie les raisons qui ont
donn6 lieu a la popularitd grandissante du franchisage. II examine les principaux
modules de r6glementation des contrats de franchise, ainsi que les diverses
doctrines de common law que les tribunaux ont appliqu6es aux litiges r6sultants
de tels contrats. L'auteur souligne les lacunes des modeles existants de r6gle-
mentation des franchises et y propose une alternative s'inspirant des solutions
juridiques aux conflits familiaux.
Introduction
Franchising is a hydra-headed corporate invention, defying simple de-
scription-it is at once a sophisticated form of trade-mark licensing, 2 a
contractual alternative to corporate vertical integration,3 a low-risk
* 1996, Richard Haigh, School of Law, Deakin University. I would like to thank my research
assistants Lona Nallengara and Brian Dartnell for helping gather materials for this paper,
Terrence McNamee for his proof reading and editing skills and Reuben Hasson for his
assistance and guidance throughout.
1. This title is a play on R.H. Mnookin & L. Komhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce" (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 950. As I discuss in this paper, the
developments in family law may prove useful for analyzing and developing legal strategies in
franchising law (see infra Part IV).
2. See generally R. Davis, "Franchising in the United States" (1980-81) 5 Can. Bus. L. J. 347
at 349; Franchising, infra note 12; A. Trebilcock & D. M. Sutin, "Franchise Legislation in
North America" (1988) 5 Bus. & Law 3.
3. See S. Makar, "In Defense of Franchisors: the Law and Economics of Franchise Quality
Assurance Mechanisms" (1988) 33 Vill. L. Rev. 721 at 722 note 2. The term "vertical
integration" refers to situations where a company distributes its own goods by owning its
distributors.
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method of accumulating capital' and a marketing technique for distribut-
ing products or services.' It has been lauded as a business saviour for
minority entrepreneurs6 and promoted as a corporate vehicle where
franchisor and franchisee can both contribute value for their mutual
benefit.' Unlike a bare license, where there is little or no control exercised
over the licensee, or an employment contract, where control over employ-
ees can be excessive, there is a more subtle exercise of control in
franchising. 8
The legal definition of franchise is equally ephemeral. Franchising
laws, adopted in a number of jurisdictions in the United States (as well as
Alberta), vary widely and are frequently modified.9 In other provinces
(and states without franchising legislation), the definition has developed
jurisprudentially." Curial deference to the wiles of commercial lawyers
lends credence to the courts' general reluctance to close the category of
franchise, so that each franchise agreement is stilljudged on its own terms
and conditions. "'
4. See generally D. Sugarman & G. Teubner, eds., Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990); and Macaulay, infra note 27.
5. See T. Gilbert & D. Jung, Franchising in Canada: A guide for Franchisors and Franchi-
sees, 2d ed. (Toronto: CCH Canadian Limited, 1992) at 3.
6. See L. Korot, "Making Franchises Available to Ghetto Businessmen" (Sept. 1969 Special
Issue) 25 Bus. Law 91. See also W.M. Sayre, "Franchising in the Ghetto" (Sept. 1969, Special
Issue) 25 Bus. Law. 73. For a discussion on the value of franchising to First Nations, see (1970)
Continental Franchise Rev. at 5.
7. See J. Fels, "Problems of Principal and Agent", in J.E. Rice, ed., The Franchising
Phenomenon (Ann Arbor: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1969); G.K. Hadfield,
"Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts" (1990) 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 927.
8. See Department of Financial and Commercial Affairs, Report of the Minister's Committee
on Referral Sales, Multi-level Sales and Franchises, July 1971 [hereinafter Grange Report]
at 36.
9. Compare the definition of franchise in California with the definition used in the Franchises
Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17. Alberta supposedly adopted its original franchising act from
California, yet the definitions are quite different. In its most recent form, the Franchises Act,
S.A. 1995, c. F-17.1 (see infra at note 86 and accompanying text) the definition was revised
as it was apparent some franchisors circumvented the act simply by masking the fees payable
by franchisees.
10. See for example Magnetic Marketing Ltd. v. Print Three Franchising Corp. (1991), 4
B.L.R. (2d) 8 (B.C.S.C.); 387071 Ontario Ltd., v. 526770 Ontario Ltd. (1988), 66 O.R. (2d)
167 (H.C.J.). In the latter case, the franchisee argued that it should be an implied term of a
franchise agreement that the franchisor will advertise, train, specify ingredient types, supply
uniforms, etc. It was the franchisee's position that there was no requirement to pay royalties
because the franchisor failed to comply with these implied provisions. The Court stated that
franchising is a business organization having a variety of forms; in this case the franchisee knew
or ought to have known at the outset of the relationship exactly what was expected of the
franchisor. It is clear that there was extreme hesitancy on the Court to extend the ambit of
implied terms and judicially create a definition of franchising.
11. See 387071 Ontario Ltd., ibid. Also see Bawitko Investments Ltd. v. Kernels Popcorn Ltd.
(1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 97 (Ont. C.A.) where the Court, in determining whether a franchise
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Franchising is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. Although
there is some dispute about the first use of franchising, 12 it is generally
recognized that the Singer Sewing Company developed it approximately
100 years ago. 3 Fifty years later, Henry Ford started the first widespread
use of franchising by developing distribution and sale networks for his
Model T Ford automobiles. 4 The marketing genius of Ford provided the
catalyst for others, like soft drink bottling companies and gas station
franchises.15 The fast food industry in the 1950s started the second wave
of franchising where business format models proliferated. 6 Today,
franchising is ubiquitous, covering such diverse industries as conve-
nience stores, auto parts and service shops, hotels, real estate agencies,
personnel services, accounting firms, and others.'7
This unprecedented commercial growth in franchising is directly
attributable to its success-whereas most independently formed busi-
nesses fail at a rate of 80 percent, franchises typically fail only 20 percent
of the time.' 8 Franchising is now the predominant method of retail
business expansion in Canada and the United States. 9 Figures published
by the Canadian Franchising Association estimate that in 1995, retail
sales in Canada through franchising will reach approximately 77 billion
dollars. This accounts for approximately 45 percent of all sales in
Canada.20 A ten-fold increase in the number of franchised outlets in
agreement was concluded prior to signing of a formal written document, stated that franchises
are not conventional arrangements and therefore require specialized documentation, many
items of which vary from agreement to agreement..
12. See for example H. Brown, "Franchising-a Fiduciary Relationship" (1971) 49 Tex. L.
Rev. 650. Brown states that franchising had its inception over 125 years ago when brewers
licensed beer gardens for distribution purposes. Compare with P.F. Zeidman, "Franchising in
the U.S.: An Overview of the Regulatory Framework" in P. Denault & L. Colton, eds.,
Franchising (Cowansville: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1993) at 217. Zeidman states that the
origins of franchising can be traced back to the middle ages, when churches used networks
(which under modem definitions could be described as franchises) to collect revenues and
donations in return for clerical services (at 219).
13. For example, see F. Zaid, "Overview of Franchising" in Franchising, ibid. at 3; Zeidman,
ibid. at 217.
14. Zeidman, ibid. at 219.
15. T.M. Pitegoff, "Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors," (1989) 45
Bus. Law. 289. See also Macaulay, infra note 27.
16. See Pitegoff, ibid.
17. Ibid. at 290.
18. Zaid, supra note 13 at 3. The reasons typically attributed to this statistic include the
franchisor's proven system, name recognition, minimal requirement for developmental
capital, and the consequent lower risk for franchisees.
19. Ibid. at 3-17.
20. Trebilcock & Sutin, supra note 2. See Franchising in the Canadian Economy (Toronto:
Price Waterhouse, 1992) for statistical information on the franchising industry. The study cites
the following statistics for 1992: total number of franchised establishments 25,052, total
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Canada was observed between 1979 and 1989.21 Statistics in the United
States mirror those in Canada.
22
What are the reasons behind this staggering growth? In simple terms,
franchisors and franchisees alike are seduced by the perceived benefits of
franchising as compared with independent ownership. For the franchisor,
these include growth with low capital outlay, cost sharing, maximizing
profit and stability. For the franchisee, there is a belief that the commer-
cial risks inherent in most business ventures are virtually nonexistent.
This is due to a number of factors including the track record of a
franchisor, the granting of relative independence (but with enough
assistance, knowledge and expertise from the franchisor to ensure suc-
cess), the use of ready-made intellectual property and therefore concur-
rent low initial outlay of capital and the collective buying power of a
franchising system.23 Franchising has proven popular enough to engage
discussion of franchising for law firms 24 and farming, 25 although neither
of these proposals have, to my knowledge, been implemented.
Theoretically, a franchise allows a franchisor to achieve rapid growth
with a minimum of capital expenditure, at the same time providing the
benefit of profit-motive on the part of the franchisee. An ongoing revenue
stream, in the form of initial fees and continuing royalties, provides
access to rapid capital accumulation, while additional benefits, such as
product pricing provisions and property leases, ensure additional control
over the franchisee. In theory, the franchisee is motivated by a share in the
profits, assured by the infrastructure of the franchise system of the ability
to compete effectively with other large corporations.
26
revenue from business format franchises $16,688,343,000, from product and trade name
franchises $57,100,000,000. The Canadian Franchise Association claims that in 1994 there
were approximately 1134 franchisors and 60,000 franchisees operating in Canada.
21. Zaid, supra note 13 at 15.
22. According to Davis, supra note 2, in 1980, total sales from franchises in the United States
was 337.6 billion representing 36% of total sales. In 1980 there were 488,000 franchises, an
increase of 6% over 1979. Davis cites figures showing that 41% of all U.S. foreign franchises
are Canadian and that in 1978 there were 7,048 Canadian franchises owned by U.S. parents.
This number has increased to 9,544 business format franchises in Canada in 1988 (see
Trebilcock & Sutin, supra note 2 at 25).
23. See Gilbert & Jung, supra note 5. Of course, at the same time, there are associated risks.
From the franchisor's point of view, franchisees are generally more independent and may be
more difficult to control than employees. For franchisees, the restrictive operational practices
imposed on them and complex, one-sided agreements may seem unfair. See also discussion at
Part IV.
24. J. Lester, "McLaw: The Franchising Debate" (1987) 11 Can. Law. 24.
25. J.C. Lemmon, "Reinventing the Farm-Franchising" (1986) 51 Bus. Q. 13.
26. See J.A.H. Curry, Partners for Profit: A Study of Franchising (New York: American
Management Association, 1966) at 33. Other commentators view the franchisee's motivation
through profit as the essential element of a franchise, and a large contributing factor to the
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Franchise relations will contain, in varying degrees, elements of trust,
cooperation and reciprocity, alongside elements of coercion and depen-
dence. 27 The soundness of the relation between franchisor and franchisee
depends to a large extent upon the control exercised by the franchisor.
Even before an agreement is signed, common pre-contractual represen-
tations made by a franchisor provide evidence of the amount of control
available to the franchisor.
This paper is divided into four parts. The first part consists of a brief
review of some of the forms of legislation specific to franchising that have
been adopted in North America and an overview of the history of this
legislation. The second part examines common law remedies that are
particularly apt for resolving franchising disputes: emphasis is given to
implied standards of good faith in contracts and fiduciary obligations.
There is also a brief discussion of the idea of self-regulation by franchise
associations. Part three of the paper discusses the theoretical underpin-
nings of franchise governance models based on current relational and
corporate group theories. It suggests analyzing franchise relationships by
drawing analogies from family law and constructs an idea of a fidelity
relation for franchising. The final part examines how the fidelity concept
may be applied and looks at possible legislative or judicial action in this
area.
I. Government Regulation of Franchising
2
1. The Forms of Legislation
a. Introduction
The first law specifically regulating franchising was enacted in the United
States in the 1950s to protect automobile dealers.2 9 Thereafter came
success of franchising generally (See Makar, supra note 2, for example). Although it is outside
the scope of this paper, I query why employee profit-sharing plans are not equally as effective
or as popular.
27. S. Macaulay, "Long Term Continuing Relations: the American Experience Regulating
Dealerships and Franchises" in Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper No.
10 (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin-Madison Press, 1990).
28. Virtually all regulation relating specifically to franchising is found in North America.
Australia has made attempts at regulating franchising; certain regulations under the Companies
Code now include franchising arrangements. There are also the Petroleum Retail Marketing
Franchises Act (1980) (Commonwealth) and the Estate Agents Act (Victoria) which indirectly
regulate franchises in these specific areas. For a more detailed analysis, see I. Goddard,
"Franchising Law: the Current Position" (1989) 63 Law Instit. J. 711.
29. Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §1221-25 (1988). See S. Macaulay
supra note 27 for a good review of the legislative history resulting in this.
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individual state legislation, initially targeted at specific industries,30
followed by legislation dealing with franchising in general.3 Debate still
rages about the efficacy of franchising laws; the discussion has become
partisan.1
2
Recent developments throughout North America suggest the wishes of
franchisors have prevailed. In the last decade, many states have amended
their franchising legislation, reducing the protection given to franchisees.
This backlash against franchise legislation has carried over into Canada
and is reflected in some provinces rejecting proposed legislation.33
Nevertheless, as Stadfeld notes, in calling for increased government
action:
Franchising is too important to be governed by contracts of adhesion
unilaterally drafted by franchisors and often offered to franchisees on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Despite their necessary and historically important
contributions to franchising, few franchisees have meaningful rights in
their long-term relationships with franchisors.
3 4
In the wake of the 1990 recession the need to adequately assess and
reform egregious franchising practices has not gone unnoticed.35
b. Forms of Legislation
Legislation governing franchises generally fits into three categories:
disclosure, registration or relational. Disclosure and registration schemes
require franchisors to prepare formal documents (usually referred to as
statement of material facts or prospectus) that are submitted to franchi-
sees along with the franchise agreement. Both these schemes are premised
30. See Macaulay, supra note 27 at 39ff.
31. See ibid. at 47ff.
32. Those supporting the legislation tend to be in favour of commercial legislation in general,
and often act for franchisees. On this side of the issue, see for example, J.M. Sotos, "What's
Wrong with Franchising" (1993) Bus. & L. 33; Macaulay, supra note 27; Hadfield, supra note
7; Stadfeld, infra note 35. Those weighing in against legislation, typically laissez-faire lawyers,
often acting for franchisors, include: Makar, supra note 3; B. Klein & L.F. Saft, "The Law and
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts" (1985) 28 J.L. & Econ. 345; C.J. Faruki, "The
Defence of Terminated Dealer Litigation: A Survey of Legal and Strategic Considerations"
(1985) 46 Ohio St. L.J. 925.
33. See infra at note 85 for Alberta and note 97 for Ontario, and accompanying text.
34. L.S. Stadfeld, "Comment on Proposed U.S. Franchise Legislation: A Search for Balance"
(1992) 97 Com. L.J. 540 at 565.
35. See, for example, Sotos, supra note 32. Sotos cites instances where franchisee expenses
exceed revenues at a number of locations, where exorbitant mark-ups on equipment required
to be purchased by franchisees have bankrupted franchisees. The same equipment is available
at local department stores for a fraction of the costs mandated by franchisors. Other instances
cited include franchisors' failure to pay suppliers that franchisees are mandated to order from
and franchisors' failure to use advertising contributions for their intended purposes.
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on the belief that with adequate data a prospective franchisee is able to
make an informed decision on whether to enter into a franchise relation.
Once this is determined, the franchise agreement governs the ongoing
terms and conditions of the relation. Relational legislation affects the
ongoing verities of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee. In
these types of statutes, common law remedies are modified in order to
strengthen a franchisee's position. Some jurisdictions have created
hybrid systems employing characteristics of each of the three schemes.36
b.1 Disclosure
Disclosure schemes generally require a franchisor to prepare, for review
by the franchisee, a prospectus or statement of material facts that includes
all material information relating to the franchise.37 Sometimes there is a
cooling off period to allow the potential franchisee time to reflect prior to
committing itself to the relationship.38 If the prospectus is breached, there
are often penal sanctions levied against the franchisor and its manage-
ment,39 and franchisees are given civil remedies such as rights of
rescission for material misrepresentations.4" Disclosure systems do not
require the franchise prospectus to be filed with any governmental
agency; rather, it is assumed that the franchisee will pursue any self-help
remedies available to it in the event the franchise agreement is breached.
b.2 Registration41
Registration schemes are similar to disclosure-only forms of legislation,
but with increased governmental involvement. Under a registration
scheme a sample prospectus must be filed and registered with an
administrative agency prior to the selling of franchises. Typically, the
agency is granted various powers to withhold registration based on the
36. Seethe original FranchisesAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. F- 17 (Alberta), supra note 9, forexample
[hereinafter 1980 Act].
37. The Franchises Act, S.A. 1995, c. F-17.1 [hereinafter 1995 Act] typifies the disclosure
format. See s.4 and Regulation 240/95 for the disclosure requirements.
38. See S.A. 1995, c. F-17.1, s. 4(2).
39. See R.S.A. 1980, c. F- 17, s. 34.
40. See R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17, s. 37. For further explanation, see Trebilcock & Sutin, supra
note 2 at 3. The 1995 Act provides franchisees with a right of action for damages against the
franchisor, every director of the franchisor at the time the prospectus was received, experts who
provided opinions within the prospectus and against those who signed the certificate (see S.A.
1995, c. F- 17.1, ss. 9 and 10). Rights of recision are only available in cases where the franchisor
fails to deliver the prospectus within the time restrictions (s. 13).
41. The 1980 Act typifies the registration format. See R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17, ss. 6-33 for
provisions relating to registration.
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documents provided by the franchisor. In addition, some jurisdictions
require registration of the franchisor's sales force4 2 and biographical
histories of members of management.4 3 The theory behind registration
legislation is that disclosure, on its own, is insufficient to protect a
franchisee; government assistance, therefore, is needed to determine the
adequacy and fairness of franchise agreements. Yet, at the same time,
government usually absolves itself of any liability in reviewing the
franchise agreement and prospectus." Because of these constraints,
registration systems are more costly to administer-fees for filing the
prospectus 45 are coupled with high transaction costs for legal and admin-
istrative preparatory work prior to registration. Eventually, these addi-
tional costs are borne by consumers as secondary costs passed down by
the franchisee.46
b.3 Relational
Unlike the above-mentioned forms of regulation, relational legislation
attempts to circumscribe the franchisor's behaviour by prohibiting cer-
tain practices, the majority of which regulate the content of renewal,
transfer and termination provisions in franchise agreements.47 Although
the thrust of such legislation is to promote fairness, some commentators
have criticized it as being, on the one hand, too inflexible, but on the other,
too easily circumvented by franchisors. Imaginative franchisors often
devise tactics to enhance their power over franchisees based on the
wording of the legislation.
41
42. See R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17, s. 20.
43. See R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17, Form 1, "Application For Registration of a Franchise". For
commentary, see Trebilcock & Sutin, supra note 2 at 4.
44. See, for example, R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17, ss. 32 and 40.
45. See regulations under R.S.A. 1980, c. F- 17, s. 4, for example. Prior to the adoption of the
Franchises Act, S.A. 1995, c. F- 17.1, the application fee for a franchise (or annual renewal) was
$500, for registering a salesperson, $300.
46. The additional costs associated with registration systems have provided much of the
impetus for recent reversals in a number of jurisdictions employing this form of legislation
(Alberta is a noteworthy example). Both franchisors and franchisees have complained about
the additional costs. See also Canadian Franchise Association statistics that estimate $40,000
initial costs for a franchisor to meet the old Alberta requirements.
47. See Trebilcock & Sutin, supra note 2 at 4. Other areas that may be subject to regulation
include unfair practices such as statutory sanctions for misrepresentation of the level of success
of a franchise (see R.S.A. 1980, c. F-17, s. 37 for example); procedures to ensure that any
modifications to the franchise agreement are made known (see R.S.A. 1980, c. F- 17, s. 17, for
example); provisions respecting the use of non-competition clauses and promotion of free
association among franchisees. See also Cal. Corp. Code § 31000 Pts. 3 & 4 (West 1980). Other
jurisdictions employing some form of relational regulation of franchises include Arkansas,
Califomia, Michigan, New Jersey, Washington-see Davis, supra note 2 at 355.
48. See Trebilcock & Sutin, supra note 2 at 4.
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Despite a number of years of experience with relational legislation,
courts remain reluctant to depart from many of the traditional common
law contract principles, with the result being that relationship laws are
often ineffective. The arguments courts may use are based on choice of
law,49 or centre on the fact that parties were of equal bargaining power and
therefore there was no "community of interest"5 or that there was no
franchise because the meaning of a franchisee was narrowly construed.5'
Courts may also simply ignore legislation under the guise of allowing
broader freedom of contractual rights.52 In one case, a court allowed the
franchisor to terminate an agreement of indefinite duration despite a law
requiring a franchisor to have good cause prior to terminating an agree-
ment.53 This judicial timidity, as P.M. Pitegoff states, can be ascribed to
the political nature of many of the franchise relationship laws; that is, they
are often used as political solutions to legal problems.
49. See Modern Computer Systems v. Modern Banking Systems 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989)
(declining to apply the franchise relationship law of Minnesota, and relying on the parties'
choice of Nebraska law); Tele Save Merchandising v. Consumers Distributing 814 F.2d 1120
(6th Cir. 1987) (employing New Jersey law over the Ohio Business Opportunity Plans Act, and
relying on the express contractual choice of the parties). In Canada, see Nike Infomatic, infra
note 87.
50. Thus the relationship was not covered under the Franchise Practices Act (New Jersey)-
see New Jersey Am. Inc. v. Allied Corp., Business Franchise Guide (CCH) p. 9395 (3rd Cir.
1989) ("good cause" termination requirement was inapplicable because there was no commu-
nity of interest between the two parties to bring the relation within the definition of "franchise"
in the Act); Colt Industries v. Fidelco Pump & Compressor Corp., Business Franchise Guide
(CCH) p. 9095 (3rd Cir. 1988) (distributor was not found to be a franchisee because it failed
to establish that it was subject to the whim, direction and control of a more powerful entity
whose withdrawal from the relationship would "shock a court's sense of equity"). "Community
of interest" was also narrowly construed in Neptune TV Inc., 402 A.2d 595 and Cat Industries
Inc. v. Fiskelles Pump & Compressor Corp., 844 F.2nd 117 (3rd Cir. 1988).
51. Brawley Distribution Co. v. Polaris Industries, Business Franchising Guide (CCH)
p. 9388 (D. Minn. 1989) (based on the definition of franchise under the Franchising Act
(Minnesota).
52. For example, see Zeigler Co. v. Rexnord Inc., 433 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1988). Here, a dealer
rejected the onerous terms of renewal proposed by the supplier. Despite the existence of the
Fair Dealership Law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the dealer's rejection was not
saved by the legislation as the terms were "essential, reasonable and non-discriminatory"
(at 12).
53. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Oregon Medical & Surgical Specialties, Inc., Business
Franchise Guide (CCH) p. 7580 (1980-83 Transfer Binder) (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Court found
that good cause existed simply because the agreement had been in effect long enough for the
franchisee to recoup its investment (based on Minnesota Franchise Act. See also Medina &
Medina v. Country Pride Foods, Ltd., Business Franchise Guide (CCH) p. 9245 (1987-89
Transfer Binder) (1st Cir. 1988). In jurisdictions where good cause is required to terminate an
agreement, courts are not willing to hold that the absence of termination language means an
agreement will run forever-see Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds,
280 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1960).
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... there is no consensus on the ideal franchise relationship law. On the
contrary, these laws are surprisingly lacking in uniformity. One reason for
this lack of uniformity is that decisions regarding these laws often reflect
the outcome of political battles rather than a reasoned approach to
franchising.
Too many State laws have arisen out of political power struggles; the
statutes in many cases represent a legislative victory for one side or the
other based on political strength, rather than being the considered outcome
of an effort to produce efficient, fair and balanced law. Current law, in
many instances, misses a fair balance between the interests of franchisor
and franchisee and often ignores altogether the interests of consumers,
other franchisees in the particular franchise system, or prospective fran-
chisees in that system. 4
b.4 Other Forms of Legal Relief
There are, in most jurisdictions, a number of statutes governing business
relations in general, as well as common law principles that indirectly
affect franchising. In Ontario the Business Practices Act, the Discrimina-
tory Business Practices Act and the Unconscionable Transactions Relief
Act, amongst others, may apply to franchise relations.5 Common law
doctrines that may be applicable to franchising include decisions based
on agency,5 6 restraint against trade,57 fiduciary relations58 and equitable
doctrines such as good faith.5 9
54. Pitegoff, supra note 15 at 289.
55. BusinessPracticesActR.S.O. 1990, c. B. 18 (see ss. 2 and 4 forexample); Discriminatory
Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. D. 12; Unconscionable Transactions ReliefAct R.S.O.
1990, c. U.2. The Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.42 requires all motor vehicle
dealers to register with the Province-it is not, however, comparable with franchising
registration schemes. In the U.S., see Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 1812.200ff (West Supp. 1980).
56. A franchisor may be liable if it possesses sufficient control to be characterized as an agent.
See for example, Billops v. Magness Const. Co., 391 A.2d 196 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1978); Kosters
v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347 (1979); in Canada, the case of Re BeckerMilk Co. (1973), 1 O.R.
(2d) 739 (Div. Ct.) is an example where Becker's store operators were found to be employees,
ie. not independent contractors-but this finding relates mainly to a determination for purposes
of the Employment Standards Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. E- 14)and carries little weight as a precedent
for substantive contractual remedies. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
57. See competition laws in the United States and Canada. Some of the areas impinging on
franchising include exclusive grants to franchisees, restrictions on territory, tied selling, price
fixing (s. 61 of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-3 1), abuse of dominant position (s. 78)
and control of supplies by franchisors (see s. 77). Some states prohibit covenants against
competition, such as, for example, California.
58. See infra at notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
59. See infra at notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
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2. United States Franchise Regulation-A Brief History
During the Depression of the 1930s, sales of automobiles declined. In
order to counteract this trend, automobile manufacturers began terminat-
ing some of their franchisees in order to realize sunk investments. In many
instances, the net effect was a complete breakdown of franchisor-
franchisee relations.60 Wisconsin reacted to this in 1935 by passing a
statute requiring all manufacturers and dealers in the state to be licensed.6'
The Wisconsin Act proscribes a number of unfair acts of manufacturers
including coercion related to delivery of vehicles and unreasonable
cancelling of franchises.
After World War II, growth in the economy prompted automobile
manufacturers to again use coercive tactics in order to force dealers to sell
cars. As a result, Oklahoma passed its own manufacturer-dealer statute
modelled after the Wisconsin Act.6 The most noteworthy difference in
the Oklahoma Act was that it introduced the concept of a Motor Vehicle
Commission, whose members are most often drawn from the ranks of
automobile dealers, to administer the legislation. Many states have since
followed Oklahoma's example and appointed dealers to act as officials
exercising statutory authority.
63
By 1956, although seventeen states had some form of automobile
dealer-manufacturer legislation, attempts to pass similar statutes in other
states were thwarted. The concern over a lack of national standards
prompted Congress to pass the first federal franchise legislation, the
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act.'
In other industries, however, abuses continued to mount; in response,
general legislation was promulgated in a number of states. The California
Franchise Investment Law was the first general registration and disclo-
sure law governing franchise sales.65 A number of other states soon
followed and registration and disclosure laws were passed throughout the
1970s (Alberta also passed such a law in 1971). This evolved into some
states drafting franchise relationship laws, some of which were enacted
as part of a registration and disclosure scheme.
66
60. Macaulay, supra note 27 at 27.
61. Finance Companies, Automobile Dealers, Adjustment Companies and Collection Agen-
cies, W.S.A. c. 218 (West St. Ann. 1982). It is still in force today.
62. Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 47 § 564 (West).
63. Macaulay, supra note 27 at 29ff.
64. 15 U.S.C. p. 1221-25 (West 1988). In 1964 Puerto Rico was the first U.S. jurisdiction to
pass legislation protecting all types of local dealers.
65. Franchises Act, Cal. Corp. Code § 30000 et seq (West 1980).
66. Pitegoff, supra note 15 at 291. The influx of legislation during the 1970s did not carry over
into the next decade. A number of states proposed franchise legislation during the 1980s but
16 The Dalhousie Law Journal
In 1978, Congress enacted legislation protecting gas station franchi-
sees.67 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission issued a rule on
franchising requiring pre-sale disclosure.68 The FTC Rule became effec-
tive in 1979. Little else has occurred since then.
Among both franchisors and franchisees there was widespread disap-
pointment with many of the legislative initiatives, related primarily to the
lack of consistency from state to state. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) responded by creat-
ing a uniform state franchising law, but this has yet to be adopted in any
state.69 The reason for this apathy, as Pitegoff argues, is that states without
disclosure laws take comfort that the FTC Rule provides adequate
coverage, while other states rely largely on either current laws relating to
franchising or the common law.
70
In 1992 two franchising bills were proposed in the House of Represen-
tatives. The first, the Franchise Disclosure and Consumer Protection Act
(FFDCPA),71 prohibited fraud, deception and misrepresentation, includ-
ing any violation of the FTC Rule, and required revenues and costs
accrued by franchisors to be disclosed. The Fair Franchise Practices Act
(FFPA)72 prescribed legislative standards of conduct for good faith and
due care, along with a limited fiduciary duty in certain circumstances.
Both the FFDCPA and the FFPA died upon adjournment of the 102nd
Congress.
73
the conservative agenda seems to have won over - for example, in 1989, Franchise
Termination and Non-Renewal legislation was proposed but defeated in Kansas (H. B. 2244),
Maryland (H. B. 1066), Massachusetts (H. B. 1317), South Dakota (H. B. 1355), and Tennessee
(H. B. 319).
67. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801-06 (West 1988). The experience
of gasoline dealers is one rife with abuses and extremely unfair practices on the part of the major
oil manufacturers-see H. Brown, infra note 137 at 656-658. Brown is unconvinced that even
with both government action and caselaw decided in franchisees' favour, any positive effect
on oil companies' behaviour has occurred.
68. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Oppor-
tunity Ventures, 16 CFR Part 436 (1979) Business Franchise Guide (CCH) p. 6080.
69. Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act, Business Franchise Guide (CCH)
p. 3600.
70. Pitegoff, supra note 15 at 292.
71. H.R. 5232. Proposed by Congressman LaFalce.
72. H.R. 5233. Also proposed by Congressman LaFalce.
73. For a more detailed analysis see L. Stadfeld, supra note 34; 10 Fran. L.J.
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Currently three states have disclosure-only legislation,74 twelve have
registration legislation75 and eighteen have franchise relationship laws.
76,77
Seven of sixteen states (as well as Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia) incorporate franchise relationship laws as part of a franchise
registration or disclosure law system.7" These lines are continually being
redrawn: the recent trend is away from state intervention, for reasons
ranging from change in political climate, ineffectiveness of franchise
registration schemes, and increased compliance costs associated with
regulatory programs.79
3. Franchise Legislation in Canada
a. Alberta
a. 1 Introduction
Alberta introduced franchise legislation in 1970 and is still the only
Canadian jurisdiction to have done so. 80 The original Franchises Act
74. Hawaii, Michigan and Oregon. Although not technically registration states, Hawaii
requires franchisors to file offering circulars at least seven days prior to the sale of a franchise
and Michigan requires franchisors to file a notice before offering for sale or selling a
franchise-see Hawaii Franchise Investment Law § 482E-3 and Michigan Franchise Invest-
ment Law § 445.1507a(l).
75. California, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
76. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, South
Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
77. As noted in the above discussion, there are also special industry laws dealing with
particular franchising areas such as motor vehicles, farm implements and machinery, motor
fuel, beer and liquor industries. For up-to-date status of franchising laws and regulation in the
United States, see G. Glickman, Franchising (New York: Matthew Bender, serial).
78. California, Illinois, Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. See
Pitegoff, supra note 15 at 293.
79. One of the major problems confronting franchisors is attempting to prepare agreements
and disclosure documents in order to meet a profusion of different, sometimes conflicting, state
regulatory schemes. The problem is now reduced somewhat with the adoption of the Uniform
Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC), a common disclosure statement initiated by the Midwest
Securities Administration Association. The UFOC allows a franchisor to prepare one basic
offering circular for use in all member states, with simple revisions as may be required. It has
been accepted by all member states. A further topic worth considering, unfortunately outside
the scope of this paper, would be to determine what, if any, changes to the UFOC agreement
are made for those U.S. franchises interested in expanding into Canada.
80. I will continue to refer to the original relational-format act as the 1980 Act (R.S.A. 1980,
c. F-17)and the recently adopted disclosure-only act as the 1995 Act (S.A. 1995, c. F-17.1).
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followed the California model closely,8' granting a government agency,
in this case the Alberta Securities Commission, the power to administer
the scheme. Initially the 1980 Act was a straightforward disclosure and
registration type, requiring prospective franchisors to file a detailed
prospectus with the Commission and providing potential franchisees
with similar information. The Commission, however, became increas-
ingly active in enforcing and promoting the 1980 Act, publishing eight
administrative policies82 codifying a number of "good faith" provisions.
Policy 4.2, for example, required a franchisor to show good cause prior
to terminating a franchise and set out stringent procedures for franchisors
to follow in cases of non-renewal.83
In June of 1992 dramatic revisions were proposed to the 1980 Act
under Bill 45 but these died after second reading.84 Then, in 1995, another
complete revamping of the 1980 Act was proposed under Bill 33.85 The
Bill came into force on November 1, 1995. For the 1995 Act, the main
alteration from the 1980 Act is a change in the legislative scheme from
registration to disclosure-only format. The prospectus required under the
disclosure provisions falls essentially along the guidelines established by
UFOC and is set out in detail under Regulation 240/95.86 Obviously, it is
a large concession to franchisors, who have demanded changes to the Act
for a number of years. It also lowers the protection afforded franchisees
in Alberta, although the wider definitions of "misrepresentation" and
"material fact" found in s. 1 of the 1995 Act may equalize this disparity.
81. One noteworthy provision adopted without discussion from the California legislation is
section 2 which exempts from the provisions of the Act franchisors with a net worth over $5
million that have licensed at least 25 franchises in the past five years. One wonders when size
became equated with honesty in legislative circles.
82. Administrative Policies 4.1-4.8.
83. See L. Polsky, "New Alberta Franchise Administrative Policies" (1990) 10 Fran. L.J. 7
for a commentary on these Policies.
84. Bill 45 included changes to the definition of "franchise" and a tightening of the definition
of "franchise fee" to prevent franchisors from simply dispensing with a fee in order to
circumvent the Act. The Commission, in its background paper to Bill 45, alluded to this
problem by pointing out that franchisors would describe payments made by the franchisee as
"profit sharing" or would add extraordinary mark-ups to the price of goods sold to the
franchisee, in order to deliberately avoid the Act. The proposed Bill hoped to catch virtually
all situations where a continuing financial interest-as opposed to a franchise fee-existed
between parties. Many of these concepts are incorporated in the draft Ontario Bill (see
discussion at infra, notes 97-101.)
85. The Bill was a private member's bill advanced by Mr. Doerksen.
86. See supra, note 37.
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a.2 Scope of the Franchises Act
Although the intent of the Act was to broadly regulate franchising, its
purview has been judicially limited. In Nike Infomatic Systems Ltd. v.
Avac Systems Ltd.87 the British Columbia Supreme Court was faced with
a question of which law to apply to a contract between a franchisor in
British Columbia and a franchisee in Alberta. As a secondary issue, the
court examined what effects the Act had on parties to an agreement. The
Court found that the primary purpose of the Act is regulating and
controlling franchises; the Act contains no express language for declaring
contracts void, but simply provides for certain explicit remedies. There-
fore, the court found, in obiter, that the Nike Infomatic franchise agree-
ment was not void for contravening provisions of the Act but was simply
subject to statutory penalties. Apart from the fact that the statement was
obiter, it could be dismissed as an attempt by one court to extend its reach
for businesses centred in its own jurisdiction. However, in Colour Your
World Inc. v. Avery (Robert F.) Holdings Ltd.,8 the Alberta Court of
Queen's Bench decided along the same lines. The franchisee argued that
since the franchisor failed to provide it with the required Statement of
Material Facts, the agreement was void. Matheson J. held the contract
was valid and binding even though a formal breach of the Act occurred.
It was further held that since the Act does not expressly state that unlawful
contracts are void, it is not within the power of the court to rescind the
franchise agreement.89
It is worth highlighting a few points from these decisions. First, as
between two contracting parties to a franchise in Alberta, the common
law rights of action on contracts (for example, suing for rescission or for
damages) still exist. Franchisees should be especially aware that they
cannot rely on the Act to protect them once an agreement is executed.
Secondly, the laws of other jurisdictions, as may be specified in the
franchise agreement, or based on residency, may govern, thus allowing
franchisors to circumvent some portions of the Alberta scheme. In the
Nike Infomatic case, it was possible for Nike Infomatic to avoid comply-
ing with the Act because of its ties to British Columbia.9"
87. (1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 455 (B.C.S.C.). In this case, the franchisor was based in B.C.
whereas the franchisee was based in Alberta.
88. (1988), 88 A.R. 163 (Q.B.).
89. The only provision in the 1980 Act allowing for remedies of rescission was found in
section 37. As Avery was not the franchisee, there could be no application of s. 37: "Rescission
is only available if parties to a contract can be put back in their original position. That is not
something that can be done more than five years after entering into the franchise agreement"
(at 189).
90. The implications of this decision may make it easier for franchisors to register in other
jurisdictions and avoid, in some circumstances, the provisions of the Act.
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a.3 The Future of Alberta's Franchise Legislation
In its background report prepared in advance of proposed revisions to the
Franchises Act (Bill 45), the Alberta Securities Commission noted that
franchisors were concerned that the registration process was too cumber-
some and expensive. Like their counterparts in the United States,
franchisors characterized the Act as a minefield, failing to protect
franchisors against the most flagrant abuses of dishonest franchisees and
causing increased litigation. On the other hand, franchisees expressed a
desire for more simplified, and less costly, franchise agreements and
disclosure documents, believing that the standard franchise agreement
was overly complex because of the requirements of the Act. Franchisees
continued to express the desire to be treated fairly in the franchise
relationship.9' It remains to be seen whether the 1995 Act will alleviate
any of these concerns.
Perhaps most telling to even a casual observer is the absence of
franchising legislation in any other Canadian jurisdiction. A few forays
have been made in some provinces, but they have not been successful.
The next section is a brief overview of attempts made in Ontario,
Manitoba and British Columbia.
b. Franchise Regulation in Other Provinces
b. I Ontario
The Government of Ontario undertook a comprehensive analysis of
franchising culminating in the publication of the Grange Report in 1971.91
The Report outlined a number of problems it felt were endemic to
franchising. First, it found that an inequality of bargaining power between
franchisor and franchisee inevitably produces inequitable contracts,
"even where honest attempts have been made to redress the balance
between the parties."93 Second was the often unfettered right of franchisors
to terminate franchise agreements. The Report acknowledged the need to
curtail this discretion but recognized that it must be balanced against the
need for franchisors to quickly remove incompetent franchisees.
The recommendations adopted in the Report were quite far-ranging.
One proposal considered forming a Franchise Bureau with a Franchise
Registrar94 while another advocated "fair dealing" in franchising by
mandating certain terms and prohibiting specific practices between
91. Zaid, supra note 13 at 16.
92. Grange Report, supra note 8.
93. Grange Report, supra note 8 at 39.
94. Grange Report, Recommendation #1.
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franchising parties.95 The Report recommended adopting a registration
and disclosure system similar to that employed in Alberta at the time,
listing an extensive number of items for inclusion in a prospectus, using
the California and Alberta requirements as benchmarks.96 But the Grange
Report was never adopted into legislation.
There have been other legislative attempts since 1971 but none has met
with any success. In 1987, the government announced that legislation
regulating franchises would be introduced during 1987, but the impetus
quickly died. In 1994 Bill 182, entitled the Franchises Act, 1994, was
introduced privately by the MPP from Windsor-Riverside, Jim Wiseman.
97
Bill 182 followed the original Alberta regulatory scheme by requiring, for
example, a statement of material facts,98 a prospectus99 and the registra-
tion of salespersons.'10 It also included substantive obligations for both
franchisor and franchisee by mandating standards of good faith and
commercial reasonableness in all franchising activities. 01 Given the
change in government in 1995, this Bill will not become law. Neverthe-
less, there is a chance that future legislative initiatives may rely on it as
background material for understanding some of the issues in franchising
law.
b.2 Manitoba
In 1992 a private member's bill was introduced in the Manitoba legisla-
ture calling for franchise legislation. 02 The bill required franchisors to
give a statement of material facts to all prospective franchisees,0 3 file a
prospectus with the franchising director," as well as register all sales
personnel.' 05 The bill was ultimately defeated prior to second reading.
95. Grange Report, Recommendation #3.
96. Grange Report, Recommendation #4.
97. Franchises Act, 1994, Bill 182, Ontario.
98. See ss. 5-6.
99. See s. 4.
100. See ss. 7-13.
101. See Part V of the Bill. In the notes to the Bill, this standard is described as necessary due
to a general level of dishonesty and unprofessional practices amongst franchisors. The Bill also
prohibits both parties from imposing unreasonable performance standards on the other.
102. The Franchises Act, Bill 18. Mr. Maloway. (3rd Session, 35th Legislature, 41 Eliz. II,
1992).
103. Ibid. at s. 5.
104. Ibid. at ss. 6-8.
105. Ibid. at s. 20.
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b.3 British Columbia
The British Columbia Law Reform Commission recently completed
preliminary research on franchising, but has not yet released a working
paper. Preliminary evidence is that the commission will propose some
form of legislation modelled on the disclosure-only format, tied to
recommendations for minimum standards of conduct. °6
Legislative remedies addressing some of the problems surrounding
franchising in Canada seem to have stalled. Governments are not yet
convinced that there is a need for legislation directed specifically at
franchises. It is often argued that common law remedies are sophisticated
enough to cope with all the vagaries of commercial franchising practice
and adequately ensure fairness and reasonableness between parties to a
franchising agreement. The next section examines some of the common
law doctrines applicable to franchising.
II. Common Law, Self Regulation and
Remedying Franchise Disputes
1. Franchising and the Common Law
Because franchising shares many of the features of other commercial
relations, the common law remedies that have developed over time are
useful in structuring a framework for analyzing and resolving franchise
disputes. This section is a review of some of the more common legal
doctrines that have been applied in a franchising context.
a. Implied Terms of Good Faith
Unlike the United States, where states adopting the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) have imposed an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
in contracts, 0 7 there is much debate whether concepts of good faith and
fair dealing in contracts exist in Canada. There are conflicting lines of
authority about this.
106. Zaid, supra note 13 at 23.
107. Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, provides that "every
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement". Articles 1 and 2 define good faith slightly differently, but it does include, in
certain instances, "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade". Franchisees
in the U.S. have used this implied duty to ensure that a franchisor's discretion is somewhat
tempered. A worthwhile definition of what "good faith" might mean in a franchising context
is "curbing franchisors' unlimited discretion."
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The case of Greenberg v. Meffert,'0 8 is instructive. In a contract
between a real estate company and a sales agent, a clause was included
that made commissions after termination payable at the discretion of the
real estate company. Although the case did not involve franchising, it
stands for the proposition that in some cases a court may interfere with the
exercise of discretion conferred by contract. The Court of Appeal held
that decisions made by a company should be controlled by objective
standards: "the exercise of the discretion... is subject to a requirement
of honesty and good faith.""9 This doctrine was extended into a franchis-
ing context in McKinlay Motors Ltd. v. Honda Canada Inc. 10 There, a
Honda manager did not allocate a reasonable share of cars to McKinlay
Motors, intending to force the dealer to terminate. The court stated:
I find that Honda acted in bad faith under the agreement. It is obviously an
implied term of any such agreement that the parties act toward each other
in their business dealings in good faith.'
In contrast, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Estate-Gard
Services of Can. Ltd. v. Loewen Mgmt. Corp. I2 reached the opposite
conclusion. The court relied on the express provision in the agreement
making Estate-Gard an independent contractor. The court was unwilling
to imply into a franchise contract a term as "vague as good faithoand
confidence".113
This lack of unanimity is explained to a large extent by the actions of
the individual franchisor or the franchisee, although it is often not a factor
alluded to by courts. In McKinlay, it was evident that Honda's actions
were egregious enough to warrant intervention by the court. In Yamaha
Can. Music Ltd. v. MacDonald & Oryall Ltd., 4 a case involving the
notice period for an exclusive distributorship, the court indicated that
certain factors may help raise the notion of good faith. The court stressed
108. [1985] 50 O.R. (2d) 755 (C.A.). Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was
denied at [1987] 56 O.R. (2d) 320.
109. Ibid. at 761. See also W.H. Violette Ltd. and Violette Motors v. Ford (1980), 31 N.B.R.
(2d) 394, appeal dismissed (1981), 34 N.B.R. (2d) 238 (C.A.) ("dealings between parties must
be executed and regulated in a fair and equitable manner"); Peters Auto Sales v. Chrysler
(1990), 63 Man. R. (2d) 295 (Q.B.) (court recognized that there is a general duty of good faith
but found that the facts did not give rise to a breach).
110. (1989), 46 B.L.R. 62 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.). See also Shar-Cat Corp. v. IBM Canada Ltd.
(1990), 66 Man. R. (2d) 161 (Q.B.) (implied term that IBM give reasonable notice of its
intention to change practice of submitting rebate claims on behalf of franchisee. Sixty days
notice was not fair nor in accord with the principles of natural justice).
111. Ibid. at 80.
112. (1989), 38 B.C.L.R. (2d) 362 (C.A.).
113. Ibid.at372.
114. (1990), 46 B.C.L.R. (2d) 363 (C.A.).
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the importance of the length and type of relation, the extent of the sales
force and franchisee network, the importance of an exclusive distributor-
ship to the distributor, the method of acquiring inventory and the time
needed for the distributor to acquire any replacement products,1 5 In this
instance the court was hesitant to apply a general conception of good faith
without the presence of some unreasonable or dishonest practice related
to these factors.
Anglo-Canadian courts are more comfortable imputing principles of
good faith in the negotiation phase of a contract. 16 In a franchising
context, this was applied in Avos Holdings Ltd. v. American Motors
(Canada) Inc. 7 During the negotiations to establish an AMC dealership
in Kelowna, British Columbia, Avos was informed by the company that
the only other AMC dealership in Kelowna would be terminated. Avos
acted on this advice. After a number of attempts to have AMC fulfil its
promise without success, Avos was forced to close his dealership due to
poor sales and he sued AMC. The court held that the representations of
exclusivity made by the franchisor induced the franchisee to enter into the
contract and formed an independent contract. This is an example of good
faith in another guise.' 18,119
115. Ibid. at 367 (citing Western Equip. Ltd. v.A.W. Chesterton Co. (1983), 46 B.C.L.R. 64
(S.C.)).
116. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller& Partners Ltd., 11961]3 All E.R. 891 (C.A.), aff'd
[196312 All E.R. 575 (H.L.); Esso Petroleum v. Mardon, [ 1975] 1 All E.R. 203 (Q.B.D.), var'd
[1976] 2 All E.R. 5 (C.A.) and Canadian cases following these decisions. I believe an argument
can be made that these cases simply apply a good faith requirement to the bargaining stage of
a contract.
117. Avos Holdings Ltd. v. American Motors (Canada) Inc., [19861 B.C.J. No. 1891
(B.C.S.C.) (Q.L.).
118. For another case where a franchise or other long term contractual relationship has given
rise to a finding of a collateral warranty due to pre-contractual discussions, see Atlas Supply
Co. of Canada v. Yarmouth Equipment Ltd. (1990), 30 C.P.R. (3d) 380 (N.S.S.C.) aff'd (1991),
37 C.P.R. (3d) 38 (N.S.C.A.).
119. The conceptual and practical difficulties present in establishing independent warranties
or collateral contracts have been well documented. It might have been a much greater benefit
to the body of contract law if these cases had been seen as examples of bad faith worthy of the
court's protection. See as examples amongst many others, Mendelssohn v. Normand Ltd.,
[1970] 1 Q.B. 177; Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400 (Ont.
C.A.); and Bank of Montreal v. Murphy, [ 19861 6 W.W.R. 610 (B.C.C.A.). See, as examples
where collateral contracts have not been created, Hawrish v. Bank of Montreal (1969), 2 D.L.R.
(3d) 600 (S.C.C.); Carman Construction Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1982), 136 D.L.R.
(3d) 193 (S.C.C.). For commentary on the wild and varied world of contractual misrepresen-
tations and collateral statements, see for example S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 3d
ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1993) at 225-29; K.W. Wedderburn, "Collateral Contracts"
(1959) Camb. L.J. 58 at 61-64; for a debunking of classical contract theory which discounts
the possibility of parties ever reaching an epiphany or "meeting of the minds" see I. Macneil,
whose body of work in the area of relational contracts is staggering-for example "Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational
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Good faith is also manifest in cases where courts imply reasonable
periods of notice prior to termination. Both Hillis Oil & Sales Ltd. v.
Wynn's Canada Ltd. 2' and Dart & Oliphant Holdings Ltd. v. Yamaha
Motor Canada Ltd. 2 are examples where a notice period for termination
was not expressly stated or was ambiguous. 2 2 Both courts found it fair to
incorporate some reasonable period of notice as indicating good faith. To
a large extent, these cases are dependent on the lack of an express notice
period in the contract. Obviously it is much simpler for courts to imply
terms of this nature when they are not faced with a contractual provision
dealing expressly with proper notice for termination. So far, courts have
not been willing to imply good faith provisions in contracts where
unreasonably short termination periods are expressly stated. In Part IV,
the argument will be made that imputing reasonable notice periods does
not adequately deal with the concerns of both franchisor and franchisee
in terminating a relationship: it not only ignores the need, in some
situations, to react quickly to fraudulent or other kinds of detrimental
behaviour, but it also fails to acknowledge that reasonable notice cannot
be an adequate measure of damages in circumstances where interdepen-
dency and coexistence have come to define the relation. This attempt by
courts to use good faith to render more equitable results is, therefore,
largely superficial.
b. The Franchisor as Employer
The franchisor/franchisee relationship has been characterized as a mas-
ter-servant relationship in circumstances where the franchisor exerts
extensive control over the franchisee. In two decisions in Canada "store
managers" were held to be employees, bringing the franchisors under
applicable labour standards. 123 The National Labour Board in the United
States has also found drivers operating under franchising lease arrange-
ments to be employees, rejecting the usual criterion of independence. 24
Contract Law" (1978) 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into
Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press,1980); "Relational Con-
tract: What We Do and Do Not Know" (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 483.
120. (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 649 (S.C.C.).
121. (1977), 10 A.R. 366 (S.C.T.D.). Note that there was no written agreement between the
parties in this case.
122. See Hillis, supra note 121 at 655.
123. R. v. Mac's Milk Ltd. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 714 (Alta. C.A.); Re Becker Milk Co.
(1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 739 (Div. Ct.).
124. Mister Softee of Indiana v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union 102
N.L.R.B. 22 (1966).
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The Ontario Labour Relations Board has advanced this concept further,
finding in one case a franchisor to be a "related employer" for determin-
ing collective bargaining rights.'25 There is implied in all these decisions
a determination that the extent to which a franchisor controls a franchisee
may create unintended legal consequences. 126 And the availability of
legislative tools for employees, in Ontario particularly, could be used in
the future to promote a more equitable balance between franchisor and
franchisee. 1
27
When courts sometimes find that franchisees are employees, they
insinuate that an association deeper than a simple commercial relation-
ship exists between franchisees and franchisors-or at the very least that
there is more than a simple contractual relation between independent
businesses. But it is difficult to attach precedential weight to these
decisions because they remain isolated and limited to specific employ-
ment and labour law situations. As will be discussed, 128 extending
concepts of employment law into the franchising field, as a way of
expanding equitable principles, remains unsuccessful. 2 9
c. The Franchisee as Agent
Standard franchise agreements expressly state that the parties are not
agents of each other. In a few cases, courts have delved beyond this
express statement and found a relationship of agency because the franchisor
and franchisee were so inextricably linked to each other. For example, in
three separate cases involving the Arthur Murray Dance School, the
California District Court found that the dance school exerted control
beyond that generally found in franchise relations and was therefore a
125. Penmarkay Foods Ltd., [1984] O.L.R.B. Rep. Sept 1214. See also Second Cup, [1993]
O.L.R.B. Rep. 1060.
126. An interesting example is cited by R. Davis, supra note 2 at 360. According to Davis,
some U.S. federal agencies now take the position that franchisees and their employees are
employees of the franchisor under a number of regulatory laws dealing with wages, working
hours and employment discrimination. This position is not widely adhered to and is being
strenuously opposed by both franchisors and franchisees. Nevertheless, it indicates some
flexibility in the approach government is taking in characterizing franchise relationships, and
that it may choose to fight its battles on a number of different fronts if need be (especially if
federal attempts to regulate franchising directly are failing-see supra at notes 70-74 and
accompanying text).
127. See ss. 1(4) and 7 of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2. For an analysis of
the interplay between franchising and these provisions, see Roberts, infra note 172.
128. See commentary on fiduciaries, infra at notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
129. See H. Arthurs, "The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of
Countervailing Power" (1965-66) 16 U.T.L.J. 89.
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principal, liable for the acts of its agent, the individual franchisees. 3 0 In
each case, individuals enlisted for dance lessons that were not honoured
because the franchisees were insolvent. The dancers then turned to Arthur
Murray for relief. In all three instances, the court found that the lack of
autonomy granted to the franchisee was sufficient to create a legal agency
between the franchisees and Arthur Murray. In effect, because Arthur
Murray controlled the selection of the franchise location, required each
franchisee to report gross receipts of operating revenue and pay a
percentage to it, and oversaw much of the franchisee's general operating
procedure, it was liable.
How did this situation give rise to a finding of agency, where others
have not? No satisfactory answer can be found on analytical grounds.' 3'
Today's franchise agreements are equally, if not more, onerous in the
methods used to control franchisees.'32 But the judiciary is reluctant to
import the obligations and responsibilities from agency into franchising.
While many aspects of a franchise relation mirror those of agency, there
are many other components unique to franchises that bear no resemblance
to agency.'3 3 The Arthur Murray cases are examples where the courts
130. Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 328 (Dist. C.A. 2d Dist. 1966); Nichols v.
Arthur Murray, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (C.A. 4th Dist. 1967) and Porter v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,
57 Cal. Rptr. 554 (C.A. 4th Dist. 1967).
131. See for example, Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okl. S.C. 1963); Freeman and Lockyer v.
Bruckhurst Park Properties Ltd., [ 196411 All E.R. 630 (C.A.) and cases following it in Canada.
132. For example, a sample from a standard, 50 page, franchise agreement:
The Franchisee acknowledges that, in order to foster and preserve such goodwill, the
Franchisee must operate the Centre in a manner that is consistent with the Franchise
Method and Franchisor must, therefore, exercise control over the operation of every
centre. Therefore, the Franchisee agrees to operate the Centre strictly in accordance
with the Franchise Method as prescribed in the training courses, the Manual or
otherwise.
In order that the Franchisor may be assured that the Franchisee is fully and faithfully
carrying out all of the terms and the intent of this Agreement, the Franchisee shall allow
representatives of the Franchisor at all reasonable times with or without prior notice:
(c) to inspect the Franchisee's place of business and the Franchisee's inventory;
(d) to examine the Franchisee's personal knowledge of the Franchise Method, the
Manual and other products relating to the Franchise Method...
Included as part of this franchise arrangement was a 200 page manual describing the various
techniques and procedures in the Franchise Method.
133. See Fels, supra note 7. Fels suggests that franchising, while dependent on the mutuality
of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee, like an agency relationship, is also akin
to any contractual relationship between two independent parties. Each party bears certain risks,
is entitled to certain profits and, in the end, works as an individual entity in search of a mutually
beneficial goal.
As a parenthetical note, economic analysis in franchising often proceeds on the
assumption that there is much overlap between concepts of agency and franchises. Since the
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struggled to mould traditional contractual concepts to fashion remedies
in a situation that begged for relief. They are not, however, precedents for
establishing a normative standard of agency in franchising relations.
d. Franchising as a Fiduciary Relationship
d. 1 Fiduciary Law in General
The law relating to fiduciaries is expanding. 3 4 In a complex world an
increasing number of interrelations have fiduciary characteristics, and
courts are slowly recognizing this.'35 What is now construed as a fiduciary
obligation is not based simply on the form of the relation but also accounts
for the idiosyncratic nature of each situation; 13 6 sometimes a relationship
may be described as fiduciary for some purposes, but not for others.'
3 7
franchisor controls much of the franchisee's discretionary authority, the economic model of
agency is useful descriptively for analyzing franchisees' behaviour. See P.H. Rubin, "The
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract" (1978) 21 J. L. & Econ. 223
at 225; Makar, supra note 2 at note 19.
134. For an overview of this area of law, see T. Frankel, "Fiduciary Law" (1983) 71 Calif.
L.R. 795; J.R.M. Gautreau, "Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique" (1989) 68 Can. B. Rev. 1;
L. Smith, "Fiduciary Relationships-Arising in Commercial Contexts-Investment Advisors:
Hodgkinson v. Simms" (1995) 74 Can. B. Rev. 714; for specific commentary on franchising
and fiduciaries, see H. Brown, "Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship" supra note 12; R.P.
Austin, "Commerce and Equity-Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Trust" (1986) 6 Oxford. J.
Legal. Stud. 444. For current caselaw in Canada, see Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R.
377; LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14
(S.C.C.); the minority decision of McLachlin J. in Norberg v. Wynrib (1992), 92 D.L.R. (4th)
449 (S.C.C.); Roman Corp. v. Peat Marwick Thorne (1993), 12 B.L.R. (2d) 10 ("mere
negligence does not create a breach of fiduciary duty"); Litwin Construction (1973) Ltd. v. Pan
(1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 459 (B.C.C.A.); Frame v. Smith (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 (S.C.C.)
(Wilson J., in dissent, gives an excellent discussion of fiduciary obligations in a custodial
versus non-custodial parent relationship. Her decision provided much of the impetus for the
Court's holding in Hodgkinson and LAC.); Burns v. Kelly (1987), 41 D.L.R. (4th) 577
(B.C.C.A.); Trimac Ltd. v. C-I-L Inc., [1990] 1 W.W.R. 133 (Alta. Q.B.).
135. Originally trustees were the only fiduciaries, so-called. Over time, courts recognized
partnerships, agency and solicitor-client relationships as examples of fiduciaries. Anglo-
American courts seem to have an aversion to fixing the definition of fiduciary lest it create a
closed category. However, there may be differences between institutional fiduciaries and fact-
based fiduciaries, so-called. See Gautreau, ibid. at 2 and Smith, ibid.
136. J.R.M.Gautreau goes beyond even this. He argues that the concept of fiduciary duty is
relevant only in terms of remedy and that there is no difference in substance between fiduciary
duties and other duties, other than the degree of power, reliance and vulnerability-ibid. at 17ff.
137. From Justice La Forest in Mclnerney v. MacDonald (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 415 at 427
(S.C.C.); see also Two Brothers Kingston Limited v. Zakos (1985), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 541 (Ont.
H.C.J.) aff'd (1988), 27 C.C.L.I. xxxiv (C.A.). Although the notion of examining the substance
of a relationship in order to determine whether it is a fiduciary one has some conceptual
attractiveness, it has not been applied to some of the more traditional, accepted, fiduciary
relationships. One could question, for example, whether all lawyer-client or doctor-patient
relationships are necessarily fiduciary. (For example, is a lawyer a fiduciary when asked to
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Fiduciary obligations typically flow in one direction,'38 creating a
source of trust in the entrustor by relying on another's expertise. As stated
by Frankel:
•.. fiduciary relations are designed not to satisfy both parties but only the
entrustor.... [A]n entrustor does not owe the fiduciary anything by virtue
of the relation except in accord with agreed-upon terms or legally fixed
status duties. Therefore, in a fiduciary relationship, the entrustor is free
from domination by the fiduciary, although he may still be coerced in a
parallel status relation.... [T]he entrustor's vulnerability to abuse of
power does not result from an initial inequality of bargaining power...
The relation may expose the entrustor to risk even if he is sophisticated,
informed and able to bargain effectively.'39
At the heart of a fiduciary relationship rests a moral imperative; loyalty
and honour, rather than laws or contracts, are said to govern the fiduciary's
behaviour. Courts have, with mixed success, 140 recognized this moral
aspect to fiduciary obligations,'4 ' placing much emphasis on the altruistic
and voluntariness of the relation. Legally, the relationship does not
require trust in a subjective sense between parties, but simply the
fulfilling of obligations giving rise to a legal trust. 42 It is the unidirec-
tional aspect of fiduciary obligations that is often cited as a reason for
courts not finding a fiduciary relation in franchising situations.
d.2 Fiduciaries in a Franchising Context
The sea of Canadian jurisprudence parted once to permit a fiduciary
argument to be made by a franchisee, but the waters returned on appeal. 14
In Jirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., the franchise agreement
notarize documents, or prepare articles of incorporation? (a task that can be done by law clerks,
or by the client with the self-help packages now available).) As yet, courts have not gone this
far. Compare, however, Gautreau, ibid. and Smith, supra note 134, who argue that some
relationships, such as lawyer-client, are of necessity fiduciary.
138. Although see Austin, infra note 150.
139. Frankel, supra note 134 at 801 and 810. The last part of this passage was also quoted by
McLachlin J. in Norberg, supra note 134 at 491.
140. See Gautreau, supra note 134 at 6. He describes situations where the concept of fiduciary
has "drifted from its conceptual moorings" and been confused with unjust enrichment, for
example. This confusion, or deliberate legal fiction, is unnecessary in Canada because our
concepts of both unjust enrichment and constructive trust are independent of the concept of
fiduciary obligation (see, for example, Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834).
141. See T. Frankel, supra note 134 at 829ff.
142. Gautreau, supra note 134 at 9. "Subjective trust" is taken to mean some kind of implicit
faith or confidence. For example, a dentist may not necessarily inspire confidence in his or her
patient, but the relation is still fiduciary.
143. Jirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., [1970] 3 O.R. 629 (H.C.J.). This was later
reversed on appeal, at (1971), [1972] 1 O.R. 251 (C.A.), which decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada at (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 303.
30 The Dalhousie Law Journal
constrained the franchisee in its choice of suppliers and the prices it paid.
A dispute arose when the franchisee discovered that the franchisor was
receiving kickbacks on each order the franchisee placed with the supplier.
At trial, the Ontario High Court of Justice held that the special closeness
in this case created a fiduciary relationship; that is, a constructive trust had
formed that necessitated the franchisor to account for all its earnings.
The decision was overturned on appeal. The Court of Appeal, affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada, found that the situation did not have the
necessary characteristics of a fiduciary relationship. It concluded that the
franchisee was adequately represented by sophisticated business and
legal counsel and, in any event, the profits were not secret.'I" There was
nothing exceptional to take this case outside normal franchise relations.
Although the possibility of finding fiduciary obligations in a future
franchise relation was left open, 145 no Canadian franchisee has, as yet,
successfully claimed that a fiduciary relationship exists with a franchisor.
This trend is consistent with experience in the United States 46 and
Australia'47 where courts are disinclined to find fiduciary duties in
franchise relations. In Hospital Products International Ply. Ltd. [HPI] v.
United States Surgical Corporation [USSC], the franchisee embarked on
a premeditated and sophisticated form of piracy by taking hospital
equipment provided by the franchisor, "reverse engineering" it and using
the information gained to its profit. USSC sought damages for breach of
contract and also for an accounting of profits from HPI, contending that
HPI was a fiduciary. At trial, USSC won on both counts. On appeal
though, the Australian High Court refused to find a fiduciary relation-
ship. The case mirrorsJirna in the separate findings reached by both the
trial and appeal courts, but it is a neat rejoinder to criticisms that allowing
fiduciary duties to govern franchising situations will unduly profit
franchisees. The same line of judicial reasoning that is used most often to
144. Brooke J.A. noted that the question of whether the profits were secret or not was not at
issue on appeal, but stated that he would have decided opposite to the trial judge, ibid. (C.A.)
cited to O.R. at 254.
145. Ibid. (C.A.) at 257 (cited to O.R.): A... in some cases.. the Court... should find that
the relationship.., is something other than what they themselves have provided for..."
146. See, for example, Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 846 F.2d 537 at 540ff
(9th Cir. 1988); Power Motive Corp. v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1048 at 1051
(D. Colo. 1985); Boat & Motor Mart v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 825 F.2d 1285 at 1292 (9th Cir.
1987). The law on fiduciaries is different in the United States, however, and caution must be
advised in trying to draw from it universal concepts that would apply in Canada.
147. Hospital Products International Pty. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corporation (1984),
58 A.L.J.R. 587 (H.C.), aff'g [1983] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 157 (C.A.), aff'g [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 766
(S.C.).
148. See Gibbs C.J. ibid., at 596-98.
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restrict franchisee's remedies-that a fiduciary relation is special and not
part of normal commercial practice-was used to adversely affect the
franchisor.
The recent expansion of the law of fiduciary obligations in Canada 14 9
and Australia 50 may have raised expectations that, in the franchising field
at least, the legacy established by the trial decisions in the Jirna and
Hospital Products cases could be restored. But the case of Riverside
Cycle Ltd. v. Hazen5 ' suggests that the sea may never be parted again;
that improper motivations of a party are unimportant in determining the
character of a commercial relation and that even where deliberate
predation occurs, commercial franchise relations will not be fiduciary
ones. In fact, the court held that there is no implicit fiduciary duty in a
dealer-distributor type of commercial relation. A dealer may sue for
damages if a breach of the agreement occurs, but is not entitled to
equitable remedies.'52 Strangely enough, there was no mention of either
LAC Minerals or the Australian United Dominion case in the Riverside
case.
Are we left with any scope at all for finding fiduciary relationships in
franchises? In those rare instances where one of the parties steps beyond
149. See Hodgkinson v. Simms and LAC Minerals v. International Corona Resources Ltd.,
supra note 134. The Supreme Court set out the test for determining the existence of a fiduciary
relationship as follows: (i) a fiduciary has some scope for exercise of some discretion or power;
(ii) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the
beneficiary's legal or practical interests; (iii) the beneficiary is vulnerable or at the mercy of
the fiduciary in respect of the subject. The Court in LAC stated that a fiduciary obligation will
seldom be present in dealings of experienced businessmen of similar bargaining strength acting
at arm's length. In other words, any vulnerability that may arise between business people can
be prevented through more prudent exercise of bargaining power and any wrongful exercise
of such power by the fiduciary can be addressed through an award of damages, rather than
equitable relief. In Hodgkinson, La Forest J., speaking on behalf of the majority holding in the
case, stated that the vulnerability arose out of the reasonable expectations of the parties entering
into a relationship, which depend on matters such as trust, confidence, complexity of subject
matter and community or industry standards (at 412). Smith, supra note 134 makes the point
that after Hodgkinson the test for determining a fiduciary relationship is somewhat murkier.
However, there is little to offer hope for franchisees in either of these cases (see infra).
Gautreau, supra note 134 at 18, points out that the LAC case is another example where the need
for a "fiduciary remedy" inclined the court to label the relationship as fiduciary when it
arguably was not. Gautreau suggests a similar result, but more analytically pure, could have
been established through the doctrine of unjust enrichment. A similar argument could be made
of the Jirna case, supra note 143.
150. See United Dominions Corporation Limited v. Brian Pty. Ltd. (1985), 60 A.L.R. 741
(Aus. H.C.). Although this case did not deal with franchising per se, it developed the argument
for fiduciary obligations in a commercial setting. See also R.P. Austin, supra note 134.
151. (1994), 93 Man. R. (2d) 182 (Q.B.).
152. Riverside, ibid. at 188-89. As Krindle, J. stated, when confronted with the argument that
the court should rewrite the termination clause and replace it with a notice period of one year:
"for the life of me, I can't follow the leap in logic inherent in this position." (at 188).
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all reasonable boundaries, the answer may be positive. That said, it will
have to be a gross abuse of power; something that most franchisors, at
even the most basic level of sophistication, are able to circumvent by
careful drafting of the agreement.'5 3
e. Unconscionability and Inequality of Bargaining Power
In some circumstances the remedy of unconscionability may be applied
to franchises. Like the remedies described previously, unconscionability
is fraught with analytical difficulties, exacerbated when brought into a
relational or franchising context.'54 Although unconscionability is some-
times broadly defined for inequality of bargaining power, good faith or
fair and equitable dealing,' the resulting analytical messiness means
none of these situations is determinative-there may be unconscionabil-
ity elsewhere. 5 6 Where the franchise agreement is little more than a
disguised attempt to avoid employment standards provisions, for ex-
ample, there is a natural inclination to find unconscionability as well.'57
Franchise relationship laws attempt to redress problems of unconscio-
nability and inequality of bargaining power between franchisor and
153. See Gautreau, supra note 134 at 10-14 and my comments at Part IV.
154. For commentary on the problems with the unconscionability doctrine in general in
contract law, see generally Waddams, supra note 120, especially c. 14; J.E. Murray, "Uncon-
scionability: Unconscionability" (1970) 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1; M.G. Bridge, "Does Anglo-
Canadian Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?" (1984) 9 Can. Bus. L.J. 385; Eisenberg, "The
Bargain Principle and its Limits" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741; D. Vaver, "Unconscionability:
Panacea, Analgesic or Loose Can(n)on?" (1988) 14 Can. Bus. L.J. 40; D. Vaver, "Smyth v.
Szep, Unsettling Settlements: Of Unconscionability and Other Things" (1992) 50 The
Advocate 749; R. Hasson, "Darkness at Noon" (1995) 11 B. & F. L.J. 141. For some of the
recent Canadian jurisprudence, see Mercantile Bank of Canada v. Sigurdson (1978), 86 D.L.R.
(3d) 680 (B.C.S.C.); McKenzie v. Bank of Montreal (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 64 (Ont. H.C.J.);
McKay v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1994), 20 OR. (3d) 698 (Gen. Div.); Bertolo v. Bank of
Montreal (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 577 (C.A.).
155. See ibid. and section on Good Faith supra notes 107-122 and accompanying text.
156. See Atlas Supply v. Yarmouth Equipment (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 38 (N.S.C.A.), rev'g
(1990), 30 C.P.R. (3d) 380 (N.S.T.D.). Matthews J.A. followed the minority view of Dickson
C.J. in Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426 that fundamental
breach should be laid to rest and courts should look explicitly at unconscionability and the
protection of the weakerparty (at 80ff). See alsoA & K Lick-A -Chick Franchises Ltd. v. Cordiv
Enterprises (1981), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 440 (N.S.S.C.) where the court found that the transaction
was unconscionable (franchisee was under duress, and executed anew and much less beneficial
agreement without legal advice).
157. See Head v. Intertan Canada Ltd. (1991), 5 OR. (3d) 192 (Gen. Div.). Farley J. stated,
in obiter, that in franchise agreements, where provisions exist to terminate without cause, a
court should look at the longevity of the agreement, the amount of the franchisee's investment,
etc., in order to determine whether the existence of such a clause is unconscionable. The
decision is, to my mind, very progressive.
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franchisee.'58 There is evidence of their success in controlling inequality
and limiting some of the unscrupulous behaviour of franchisors,'59 which
may even spill over into jurisdictions that do not have such laws. 160
However, as franchisees become more sophisticated, forceful and dis-
criminating in their choice of franchisors,16 1 the necessity of these laws
has been questioned. Critics of relational laws point to evidence showing
a reduction in the number of franchises terminated and the higher rates of
renewal of franchises compared to previous decades. This is apparently
sufficient, in their minds, to show greater franchisee satisfaction over-
all.162 Whether this position is just a reflection of the current economic
situation is open to question.
163
e.1 Self-Regulation of Franchises
An alternative to the public creation or development of formal legal
mechanisms specifically for franchises is to create self-regulatory bodies
through franchise associations. There are presently a number of indepen-
dent franchisee associations in Canada that are self-supporting; they are
financed by membership fees from member franchisees. The largest of
these organizations may be managed by professionals and have staff
executive directors, legal counsel and other professionals.
158. See Pitegoff, supra note 15 at 314.
159. Ibid.
160. Because most larger franchises follow the UFOC guidelines and have standardized
agreements. A number of questions that cannot be answered in this paper arise however: What
about the smaller franchises that do not operate in legislated jurisdictions? This is especially
pertinent in Canada, where a franchisor is not likely, unless intending to expand into Alberta
or parts of the U.S., to consider providing the franchisee with some of the inequality-reducing
measures. See also the query raised at note 79, supra.
161. Pitegoff, supra note 15. He cites the examples of Computerland Corp., Burger King and
AAMCO. In the Computerland situation, pressures from franchisees led to changes in the
management structure of the franchisor, and a reduction in the royalties paid by franchisees to
the franchisor. Similarly, the franchisees of Burger King participated in the buyout in 1988 of
Pilsbury (Burger King's parent). AAMCO reduced its franchise fees by 40% as a result of
franchisee pressure.
162. See for example, Pitegoff, ibid. at 314-16. Makar, supra note 2 at note 113 cites the
following statistics for U.S. terminations in 1984: Of 2,649 franchisor initiated terminations,
1419 were for nonpayment of royalties or other finances, 270 for franchisee's failing to comply
with quality control standards and 960 were unspecified. (these statistics were provided by the
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Franchising in the Economy, 1984-86 13 (January, 1986). The 1990
statistics released in "Franchising in the Canadian Economy", supra note 20 indicate that in
Canada, 275 terminations were initiated by the franchisor, 51% for non-payment, 23% for
quality control violations and 26% for other reasons; 234 terminations were initiated by the
franchisee (at 37).
163. See Sotos, supra note 32.
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So far, these associations have had relatively little impact on franchisor
behaviour."6 For instance, regulating franchising is not on the agenda of
franchisee associations. Legislation, both statutory or internally created,
is typically viewed as cumbersome and expensive by the majority of these
associations. In any event, of more concern to members is keeping abreast
of business developments, co-operating on advertising plans, planning
trade-shows and amending standard form franchise agreements.'65
Another potential supervisory body is the Canadian Franchise Asso-
ciation [CFA], which could also assume a governing role by taking steps
to eliminate unfair and fraudulent behaviour in the industry."6 There are
many self-governance models that the CFA could use for guidance. For
starters, the CFA could assist in setting membership admission and
renewal criteria, establishing a complaints review mechanism and man-
dating minimum levels of disclosure and standards of information in a
similar vein to statutory disclosure and registration schemes found
elsewhere. But self-regulation by the CFA could go much further. Certain
franchisor practices could be proscribed, thus protecting the public from
excessive abuses while pre-empting legislative encroachment on what is
seen as franchising industry territory. 167 The suggestion has merit. Un-
fortunately, because the CFA has no membership requirements, most
franchisors do not join. 168 It will, therefore, be necessary to engage the
assistance of the large number of powerful franchisors to give the
association some clout. Even if this hurdle were overcome, it remains
unclear whether self-regulation of businesses or business groups is
effective. 1
69
The discussion in the first two parts of this paper attempted to show
how neither government regulation nor the application of common law
remedies has been successful in addressing the most serious concerns of
franchisees. It is also unclear, at this stage, whether self-regulation of
164. Although arguably, the franchisee associations have significantly improved their
standing in the last few years. An interesting avenue of exploration would be to compare the
impact of unions on labour and franchise relationships with that of franchisee associations.
165. For a more detailed description of these activities, see Zaid, supra note 13 at 19-20.
166. See for example, Sotos, supra note 32 at 35.
167. See ibid. at 34-35.
168. Ibid.
169. See, for example, R.J. Bush "Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation-the Corporate
Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic Preferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea" (1993) 87 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 597; A. Blumenthal, "Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection and the
Future of the Legal Profession" (1993) 3 Kan. J.L. & P.P. 6; J. Harris, "Self-Regulation Under
Pressure" (1994) 15 The Company Law. 155. The current concerns of the Upper Canada Law
Society puts this into further perspective-if lawyers are unable to regulate their own affairs,
will franchisors and franchisees, typically adverse in interest, be up to the task?
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franchising will take hold in the commercial climate of today. How
franchise relationships may need to be re-characterized in order to bring
some sense to this rapidly exploding form of corporate grouping is the
focus of the remaining two parts of the paper.
III. Long Term Relations:
Creating a New Franchise Model
1. Introduction
Almost since the beginning of franchising, most commentators have
described the franchise relationship as contractual. Franchisees are
viewed as independent businesspeople. They negotiate franchise agree-
ments in a manner akin to negotiating a purchase of goods, despite the
overwhelming power imbalance in favour of the franchisor.170 As the
analysis presented in the previous sections has shown, even the legisla-
tive and judicial focus on franchising remains largely confined to exam-
ining the contractual implications of the relation, but in isolation, as if the
contract defined a single moment when the minds of the franchisor and
franchisee conjoined. 7' It is in this context that recent regulatory retreats
favouring franchisors occurred-the overarching principle seems to be
"if it is contractual, let the parties decide the outcome."
The perception that franchising is just another example of an entrepre-
neurial spirit that is harmed by legislative encroachment is, however,
wrong. Franchising is a creature of legislation, as are all commercial
relations. At a minimum, franchisors require protection of their intellec-
tual property rights to create a franchise system. Franchise growth also
depends upon certain competition law policies having favour; franchises
in general depend on a certain regulatory framework that narrows the
application-or relies on traditional definitions-of employment legis-
lation. 172 Where the regulatory environment strays from this, franchising
may not take hold.
Evidence from Mexico bears this out. 173 The government of Mexico
enacted the Transfer of Technology Law [TTL] in 1972 in an attempt to
protect Mexican interests by regulating foreign control over technology
170. For example, see Jirna, supra note 143.
171. See supra, Part tt. For examination of how regulation does not infringe on the basic
contractual structure, see Hadfield, supra note 7.
172. See D. Roberts, "Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: The Role of the Franchisor in the
Employment Relationship" (unpublished paper on file with the author).
173. See B.K. Hammer, "Franchising in Mexico: Paving the New Frontier" (1992) 27 Texas
Int'l. L.J. 795. I am indebted to Diane Roberts for bringing this paper to my attention.
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and providing for a central registry that reviewed all foreign contracts.
Any agreements allowing franchisors to accept royalties that were
disproportionate to the value of the acquired technology were disallowed.
Under this regulatory framework, foreign franchises never developed a
stronghold in Mexico. But when the TTL was repealed in 1991 and
replaced with the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Industrial
Property, all this changed. The new law made it much easier for foreign
franchisors to establish outlets in Mexico, as recent figures showing a
sudden proliferation of franchises in Mexico illustrate.'74
It is difficult to understand why franchisors, franchisees and the
umbrella associations alike are all reluctant to see government intervene
to force changes to current franchise practices. The changed political
climate in North America-with its aversion to regulation championed
by the business community over the last two decades-may be one
reason. Yet this explanation is not sufficient; if it were, it would assuredly
translate into public complaints about governments regulating the status
of corporations, partnerships or joint ventures, and generate newspaper
editorials urging that common law principles of contract law and fraud
adequately govern all aspects of commercial law.
Although this attitude only pervades thinking on franchising, perhaps
if franchise relations were as simple as a relation between buyer and
seller, there would be no need for additional regulatory involvement. The
franchise relation is, however, unlike any other in business and, by this
fact alone, deserves special treatment.
There are serious flaws in characterizing a franchise relationship in
traditional contractual terms. To begin with, franchising is inherently
unequal; franchise agreements are rarely, if at all, negotiated. That much
is well-known and even accepted judicially. But legislative and judicial
hesitation to use existing, though more flexible, analytical models-
agent or fiduciary being the most obvious-is a sign that perhaps it is time
to reformulate the idea of franchising. Relational contract theory provides
a convenient starting point from which my development of a fidelity
obligation derives.
2. Relational Contract Theory-An Overview
In relational contract theory, purely discrete transactions do not exist.'75
Human interaction pervades virtually all relations on a number of
174. See Hammer, ibid. at notes 33-37 and at 835.
175. See Macaulay, supra note 27. He gives the example of a traveller on a long trip who
drives into a service station and is told that she needs new tires. Both the station attendant and
the motorist know that return business is very unlikely, and so the sale seems to be a discrete
Franchising in the Shadow of Contract Law
different levels, whether through family, business or elsewhere. Moore,
Macaulay, Macneil and others refer to this as relational behaviour.
Relational behaviour is not governed as much by formalistic rules as it is
by the discretion used to enforce these rules.'76 This discretion exists in
all normal relations.
Moore defined those whose regular interactions occur within this
discretionary universe as operating within "semi-autonomous social
fields." In many instances, external laws imposed upon these social fields
do not succeed as they were intended to because of the elaborate and
complex rules and codes developed extra-legally by the individual social
system. Nonetheless, external laws often facilitate the allocation of
scarce resources by acting as reciprocities that parties can bargain with,
allowing a given social system to function smoothly.'77 In a franchising
context, acknowledging the relevance of this "private government per-
spective"'78 requires rejecting neoclassical contract law principles.
The basic tenets of relational contract theory, largely attributable to
Macneil, turn the traditional rules of contract law on their head. Classical
contractual paradigms fixate on what Macneil labels the "transactional
pole" (the discrete transaction), ignoring the continuum of contractual
transaction. But Macaulay points out that this example has relational elements: the driver may
hold a credit card, the credit card company may influence the practices of the service station,
or the station could be a franchised dealership, etc. (at 3). See also I. Macneil, "Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know" supra note 119. This issue of the Wisconsin Law
Review includes a number of articles on relational contracts from a symposium dedicated to
the body of work of Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil-it is highly recommended. Contrast
this with classical contract theory which views contracts as discrete events (see Makar, supra
note 2 at 731 ff) or economic theories related to franchising which assume certain levels of
discrete transactions depending upon the type of good (Makar at 753-54) or the location of the
franchise (Makar, at 756). It seems that many of the current economic theories of franchising
that favour less legislative intervention and more franchisor discretion rely on these outdated
notions of discrete events.
176. See S. Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1978). Moore uses as her example the ready-made women's dress industry in
New York.
177. Ibid. at 62-64. As Moore notes: "... call these 'moral' obligations, since they are
obligations of relationship that are not legally enforceable, but which depend for their
enforcement on the values of the relationship itself" (at 62). An interesting example of how
extralegal remedies become formalized legally can be seen in standard provisions on remedy-
ing disputes found in some franchising agreements. It is now common to see a dispute
resolution hierarchy whereby parties codify procedures by providing for a first-level middle
manager meeting; if it cannot be resolved at this level, then the Vice-Presidents are given a
certain time in which to resolve the problem, after which it falls to the Presidents of each
company to attempt a resolution. It is my guess that these formal contractual provisions arose
because the procedure makes intuitive sense and was probably used informally in the past. This
is a slight adjustment to theories proposed by Scott about contract rules complementing
extralegal mechanisms; see Scott, infra at note 186 and accompanying text.
178. See Macaulay, supra note 27 at 6-8.
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behaviour that culminates in Macneil's "relational pole". 79 In the pre-
scient view of a relational theorist, the traditional contractual model is far
too narrow to accommodate emerging relational, long-term arrange-
ments. Yet most modem commercial relationships are just that.
Franchising, especially business format franchising, is the apotheosis
of relational contract theory. It contains many of the components most
pertinent to Macneil's relational contract model: the overriding impor-
tance of maintaining continuity in a relation; the presence of quantifiable
and nonquantifiable elements; the range of interaction that is often
present, from altruism to self-interest to conflict; the need for continual
planning, concentrating on flexible structures and procedures rather than
on single transactions; and an emphasis on restorative remedies instead
of replacement-all are characteristics of franchising. 18 0 Standard trans-
actional models utilized in classical contract doctrine are ineffective in
dealing with many of these factors. If we are to accurately address the
character of relational arrangements, new principles and rules will need
to be formulated. 8 ' For franchise relations, this translates into a regula-
tory framework that understands how, at times, commercial relationships
form webs of interdependence not unlike familial relationships or linked
corporate groups.'82 The first-step in formulating a revised model of
franchising law is accepting that different norms of behaviour exist for
relational contracts. This may be simpler to understand for franchises as
compared to other long-term relations because of the relatively high level
of intimacy between the parties. The role of the extralegal is greater in
franchising because of the sophisticated licensing, trade-marking and
overall operational sharing between franchisor and franchisee.
Relational contract theory is, admittedly, not without its problems. It
is arguable that as contracts become more relational, formalities tend to
be downplayed, while non-material aspects of the relation become more
valued. 83 This may present insurmountable difficulties because the rigid,
binary nature of judicial decision making makes courts ill-suited to deal
with diffuse problems. Furthermore, it is wrong to assume that long-term
179. See I.R. Macneil, Contracts, Exchange Transactions and Relations, 2d ed. (Mineola,
N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1978) at 10-16; I. Macneil, "The Many Futures of Contracts" (1974)
47 S. Cal. L.Rev. 691 at 735-44. See also P. Selznick, in P. Nonet & H. Vollmer, eds., Law,
Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969). Selznick's ideas
relate to collective bargaining, but they inform much of Macneil's thinking on relational
contracts.
180. See Contracts, Exchange Transactions and Relations, ibid.
181. "Many Futures of Contracts", ibid. at 813-16.
182. See Sugarman & Teubner, supra note 4.
183. See W. Whitford, unpublished memorandum, as discussed in Macaulay, supra note 27
at 10.
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relations, simply by virtue of their longevity, are without aspects of power
imbalance. This is particularly true in franchising. 84 Finally, it may be
that rules of contract law are so entrenched in the psyche of contracting
parties that these rules simply become subsumed under one aspect of the
relation, and may in fact complement other, extralegal obligations.
85
Thus, the use of a relational contractual model might be similarly
incorporated into behavioural patterns over time.
All of these criticisms could be levelled at other legal models, includ-
ing those developed for family law. As in any analytical model, the
challenge in a franchising context is to construct a legal apparatus that
complements the realities of business relations. Within this model, it must
be acknowledged that understanding contractual relationships will nec-
essarily be incomplete, but there is also an intimate link between legal
rules and social norms that must be recognized. 8 6 Any law must strike a
balance between creating a flexible environment for franchisors to react
to substandard franchisees, and the need for franchisors to accept the
implicit value added to the franchise system by most franchisees. I have
endeavoured to find this balance by creating a model for franchises
adopted from both relational contract theories and family law, which I
refer to as the fidelity model of franchising.
IV. Fidelity Relations
1. Introduction
The franchise relationship ... does not fit neatly into any traditional
common law category. It is not a master-servant relationship and it
differs in important respects from both independent contractor and
principal-agent relationships.., the franchisor [controls] the quality of
the franchisee's goods and services. Such controls are typically more
comprehensive than those found in the traditional independent contrac-
tor relationship, but the franchisee has greater independence and busi-
ness discretion than the traditional agent. The franchise relationship is
thus sui generis.s7
184. See for example, C. Joerges, "Relational Contract Theory in a Comparative Perspective:
Tensions Between Contract and Antitrust Law Principles in the Assessment of Contract
Relations Between Automobile Manufacturers and Their Dealers in Germany" (1985) Wis. L.
Rev. 581.
185. See R.E. Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts" (1987) 75 Calif. L.
Rev. 2005; J. Kidwell, "A Caveat" (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 615. See also Falk Moore, supra note
177.
186. Scott, ibid. at 2053-54.
187. G.L. Rudnick in How to Structure and Operate a Franchise System. Papers from a
conference May 17, 1984 at 7 (Franchise Forum, OYEZ Publishing 1982).
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Even a cursory examination of current franchising practices reveals a
multitude of sins that could be improved through judicial or legislative
efforts. In many franchises, for example, the franchisee is required to
disclose intimate details about its operation and provide the franchisor
with access to confidential records and accounts. The franchisor can also
inspect, supervise and discipline the franchisee. Moreover, most fran-
chise agreements are so onerous that it is almost impossible for franchi-
sees to maintain strict compliance with the terms and conditions imposed
upon them-with the result that franchisees are probably often in techni-
cal default of the agreement. This allows a franchisor to hold over the
franchisee's head, like Damocles' sword, the power to terminate the
franchise; buttressed by non-competition covenants, a franchisor enjoys
this luxury almost unilaterally because a franchisee is usually prevented
by contract from competing, and is therefore much less likely to terminate.
Accordingly, redressing these problems in a real way requires, at a
minimum, the following: (i) moving franchise relations away from a
unitary legal model, contractual or otherwise, recognizing the various
characteristics of independent contractors, fiduciaries, agents and em-
ployees, amongst others; and (ii) substantive judicial or legislative action
that attempts to recast the form of the relationship, because the difficulty
franchisees have in staying on-side of their franchise agreement will
always allow franchisors to dominate the relationship. Simple contrac-
tual window-dressing will not be effective in controlling this.
2. Why Not Fiduciaries?
Fiduciaries, as discussed, are those acting in the interests of another party,
entrusted with a power to affect those interests. The other party relies on,
or is vulnerable to, this exercise of power. But where a party acknowl-
edges having its own interests that must be protected and advanced, or
where it is able to share in profits made, courts have difficulty finding a
fiduciary duty. Since both franchisors and franchisees can be identified
by a mutual desire to create profits, fiduciary law does not fit well within
the franchise setting.
The fiduciary model could work well in protecting franchisees, but is
not likely to find favour in Anglo-Canadian law, given the history of past
caselaw. Nonetheless, the alternative does not have to be a complete lack
of an obligation of confidence. Rather than making a clear, but dubious,
distinction between fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries, demarcated by some
magical allotment of factors related to the characteristics of a relation-
ship, it may be more constructive to ground fiduciary duties at one end of
a continuum of relations, where levels of obligation are continually
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relaxed as one moves away from the fiduciary end.'88 Fidelity duties
could describe an area of this interregnum. At least one court has hinted
at the feasibility of this concept.'89
Analytically, it is important not to attempt to solve the franchising
dilemma by viewing the franchisor-franchisee relation as one between
parties with unequal bargaining power; rather, it makes more sense to
believe in the initial supposition of the parties that the relation will be
long-term, with a common goal of profitability in the enterprise. In cases
where there is a gross disparity of power, other legal remedies are
available. On the other hand, many franchisees are highly sophisticated,
have experienced counsel representing them, and are comfortable with
the language of business. Courts rarely interfere in these instances. 90
However, by raising expectations of a long-term commitment at the
outset, and negotiating contract remedies that reflect such a commitment,
parties can more efficiently allocate resources.' 9' In a number of ways,
long-term contracts are thus analogous to marriage. As Gordon states:
parties treat their contracts more like marriages than like one-night stands.
Obligations grow out of the commitment that they have made to one
another, and the conventions that the trading community establishes for
such commitments; they are not frozen at the initial moment of commit-
ment, but change as circumstances change; the object of contracting is not
primarily to allocate risks, but to signify a commitment to cooperate.
92
188. This seems to be a novel idea for fiduciaries, although it borrows from Macneil, supra
note 175. In Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [ 1975] Q.B. 326 at 341, Sir Eric Sachs states that it was
neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to closely define the fiduciary relationship or its
characteristics. However, he goes on to add that the "demarcation line showing the exact
transition point where a relationship that does not entail that duty passes into one that does..."
implying a discrete separation of duties. This conceptualization remains undisputed. On the
other hand, I may be misclassifying commercial associations into a new category that
obfuscates further, rather than attempting to reify franchise relationships: see A.A. Leff,
"Contract as Thing" (1970) 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131.
189. See Litwin Construction, supra note 134. The Court there spoke of graduated standards
of honesty that may be applied in commercial relations. These could include discrete steps such
as (1) duty not to act unconscionably; (2) duty to deal fairly; (3) duty to act in good faith; and
(4) duty to act in utmost good faith, for example.
190. See Jirna, supra note 143 and Hospital Products, supra note 147 for example.
191. A change to a family law model may simply act as another legal resource for parties to
use in internal bargaining. Moore describes how much of the legal rights imposed by statute
can be interpreted as-the capacity of persons inside a particular social field to mobilize the state
on their behalf. For those who, by virtue of the necessities of their position, must occasionally
act outside the law, the legal rules provide leverage in bargaining for benefits in other
instances-see Moore, supra note 176 at 63-65.
Although any reconception of legal rules may be "subverted" in this manner, it is argued
that reformulating franchising rules to a fidelity model will provide a better balance of these
bargaining rights-see infra at note 193 and accompanying text.
192. R.W. Gordon, "Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in
Contract Law" (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 565 at 569. The language of marriage and human sexual
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This analogy is highly instructive when applied to the most common
problem in franchising-termination of the relationship.
3. Terminating Franchise Relationships-The Fidelity Model
Most franchise laws deal with the problem of termination by requiring
good cause prior to a party terminating the arrangement. This approach
creates several problems. First, it has resulted in excessive litigation,
ostensibly to determine the subjective meaning of good cause.1 93 But
more fundamentally, does termination for good cause really produce the
desired result? Is it not the objective, in terminating any long-term
relation, to allow parties to ensure that a break-up is not only final but,
ultimately, fair? Developments in family law over the last twenty-five
years have shown the value in allowing divorces without cause, equitable
division of assets upon marriage breakdown, and allowing parties to
make a clean break and start over (excluding possible issues related to
support that may require ongoing attention).
94
Many of these principles could be modified for use in a franchising law
context. The two competing interests that modern divorce law tries to
protect-ease of separation, because the state has little interest in ensur-
ing the continuity of failed relationships, and equitable apportioning of
value realized during the relationship-have their counterparts in fran-
chising. Arguably, it would be better to grant, with some minor restric-
tions, easier rights of termination to both franchisors and franchisees, for
much the same reason. Franchisors may need to act quickly to protect
trade-marks, for example. Franchisees may wish to terminate if losses
become unmanageable or other opportunities present themselves. On the
other hand, there is a need to value the effort put into the franchise by both
parties, even in cases where one party is in default of the agreement. This
could be accomplished by implementing a simple termination formula, as
used in family law, calculated to take into account the value brought into
relations is common parlance in everyday business dealings between companies: parties talk
of "consummating their relationship" after a transaction; of not wanting to "go to bed" with
another company until intimate details of the other are known.
193. See Pitegoff, supra note 15 at 297.
194. The Preamble to the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 is instructional in this regard:
"Whereas it is desirable to encourage and strengthen the role of the family; and whereas for that
purpose it is necessary to recognize the equal position of spouses as individuals within marriage
and to recognize marriage as a form of partnership; and whereas in support of such recognition
it is necessary to provide in law for the orderly and equitable settlement of the affairs of the
spouses upon the breakdown of the partnership, and to provide for other mutual obligations in
family relationships, including the equitable sharing by parents of responsibility for their
children."
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the relationship by both parties, as well as the value accrued over the
course of the relationship. Adding up the equities in this way would
protect both parties, since it would correct for longevity-in most cases
the initial contribution to the franchise comes largely from the franchisor,
but over time a franchisee's value to the franchise will most likely
increase."' Under this formula, termination could occur at any time,
subject perhaps to an established minimum, without detrimental effects
to the long-standing franchisee.
Similarly, termination of franchises could trigger certain minimum
amounts payable to the franchisee, as employees are currently protected
under employment standards legislation. These amounts could be based
on a combination of average revenues or profits and include the amortized
value of initial capital expenditures.
The fidelity concept could also circumvent problems that arise with the
fiduciary model. Most courts tend to view a commercial relation (espe-
cially fiduciaries) as fixed at the time of contracting, so will always make
a determination of status based on the parties' intent and the words of the
contract. A fidelity model, like Macneil's relational contractual ideal,
recognizes how relationships develop over time. Dependency that was
not present initially can set in after a number of years, altering the
character and dynamics of a relationship. Acknowledging this should be
a goal of any system of commercial justice. A fidelity model, as de-
scribed, would assess this aspect of a commercial relationship and thus
better understand the true nature of a commercial relation.
In simple terms, there is a need for equity to acknowledge that a
franchisee is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to succeed.' 96 If this
formed the basis of a fidelity model, other aspects of a franchising
relationship could be clarified. Within limits, restraints could be imposed
upon the amount of initial capitalization required from franchisees. The
maximum amount of royalties and other charges that franchisors could
levy on franchisees could be curtailed, so that sufficient revenues remain
for franchisees to obtain a fair return on their investment. And to prevent
repeating the service station experience 97 or that described in Avos
Holdings,9 8 a franchisee could be assured, as far as reasonable rules of
competition apply, of freedom from indirect and direct competition from
its franchisor. As Harold Brown concludes, franchisees should be consid-
ered independent businesses, entitled to fully protect their assets in the
195. See J.A. Brickley, F.H. Dark & M.S. Weisbach, "The Economic Effects of Franchise
Termination Laws" (1991) 34 J.L. & Econ. 101.
196. See Brown, supra note 12 at 674-75.
197. See supra note 67.
198. Supra note 117.
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same manner as the law affords other businesses."' I believe we should
go further and recognize the distinct nature of franchising.
The theoretical basis for providing remedies for breach of contract,
breach of Hedley Byrne duty, or breach of fiduciary duty, is to protect
reasonable reliance arising from an undertaking. This should form the
basis for sustaining a fidelity relationship. Just as the fiduciary principle
is resorted to in some instances in order to get a broader remedy (where
damages will not suffice), it is hoped that a form of fidelity relation may
invoke a more suitable and just method for courts to use in formulating
franchising remedies.
Conclusion
I do not presume to know whether businesspersons and their legal
advisors enjoy maintaining the status quo out of ignorance or indolence,
or use cumbersome and complicated laws in order to restrict access and
ensure the continuation of certain practices. It could be argued that the
doctrines of contract law, when applied to franchising, foster all of these
behaviours. Most common law contract remedies must be savagely
twisted out of shape in order to work for long-term franchising relations.
The same holds true for legislative remedies aimed at franchising. Those
that are not modelled solely along the lines of common law contract
theory are regulatory minefields, pathetically ineffective in granting
relief to both potential and existing franchisees.
The current system of law for franchising is costly and inefficient.
Legislation, modelled along statutes enacted for the protection of families
and family property, could begin to alleviate the concerns of both
franchisors and franchisees and present a fairer foundation with which
they could commence a discrete business relationship. And if judges re-
imagined things, they would see that franchising relationships are sui
generis, unbridled by limitations placed on present categories of fiducia-
ries, employees, agents or independents. Unfortunately, as long as the law
remains fixated on traditional contractual approaches to remedying
franchise disputes, no one really benefits.
199. Brown, supra note 12 at 675.
